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SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
Through statute, not constitutional amendment, the Utah Legislature has devised a 
tax assessment scheme - akin to a property tax exemption - for airline property, alone, that 
compels the non-uniform and unequal taxation of certain aircraft property and shields that 
taxation from meaningful review.  At issue here, Utah Code § 59-2-201(4) (“Valuation 
Law”), Utah Code § 59-2-804 (“Allocation Law”), and Utah Code § 59-2-1007(2)(b) 
(“Review Threshold Law”) (collectively “Challenged Laws”) direct  the Utah State Tax 
Commission in assessing airline property (1) to adhere to a higher, and nowhere else used, 
evidentiary standard to justify departing from a statutorily mandated airline price guide for 
determining aircraft value; (2) to grant  a discount for some, but not all owners of airline 
property that is wholly dependent on the number of aircraft owned and that does not pertain 
to any other owner of taxable personal property; (3) to use a statutory allocation formula 
that is designed to partially exempt assigned taxable property; and (4) to bar parties such 
as the Appellant Counties the ability to challenge or review the resulting assessments. (R. 
1-30, 908-920); (Appellants’ Opening Brief, p. 2-5.); (Appellants’ Reply Brief, pp. 4-5). 
Collectively, and as plainly read, the effect of the Challenged Laws is to lessen the 
legitimate estimate of fair market value of certain airline property and to thus exempt it 
from taxation. In doing so, the Challenged Laws prevent uniform and equal assessment and 
taxation in contravention of the Utah Constitution.   
Against this important backdrop, this Court has called on all parties to this appeal 
to provide supplemental briefing addressing the following questions:  
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1. Did the Counties properly allege as-applied challenges in addition to their facial 
challenges?  If so, what was the factual basis for the as-applied challenges? 
 
2. Are the alleged facts related to the 2017 tax assessments in the Counties’ 
complaint sufficient to establish that the Counties have been harmed by the 
Challenged Laws?  If not, does the complaint contain another factual basis to 
support a ripeness determination? 
 
3. Would it be proper for the court to decide the Counties’ “pure[ ] legal questions,” 
in the event we find the Counties’ claim are not connected to a concrete set of facts? 
 
4. Do any of the Counties’ claims in this case arise from facts stemming from a tax 
assessment that is not being challenged, or had not already been challenged, in 
another case? 
 
Supplemental Briefing Order, June 6, 2019 at pp. 3-4.1 
  Below, the Counties have attempted to fully respond to each separate question 
posed by the Court.  Succinctly, the Counties’ claims are “facial” in that they examine 
whether the terms of the Challenged Statutes measured against the relevant constitutional 
doctrine pass muster independent of a review of the constitutionality of any particular 
manner of their applications. (Section II, infra.) But it is because the statutes must be 
applied, and cannot be avoided, by the Tax Commission, the Counties’ claims regarding 
the statutes’ constitutionality can be determined without looking to a single, reduced 
assessment and attendant pecuniary loss.  It is because since their enactment the 
Challenged Laws’ have been and will continue to be applied by the Commission the 
                                                 
1 Framed in a manner that best captures the issues on appeal and analyzed by the Counties 
herein, this supplemental brief addressed the Court’s additional questions summarized as 
follows:  (1) whether the Counties’ claims are as-applied and if so, are they properly pled; 
(2) whether the facts alleged relative to the 2017 assessment are sufficient to establish a 
concrete injury to the Counties; (3) whether, absent a “concrete set of facts” it is proper for 
the Court decide the Counties’ claims; and (4) whether the Court may reach the Counties’ 
claims in the absence of challenged tax assessment. 
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Counties have sufficiently raised ripe questions for the trial court’s review. (Sections II, 
III.B, infra.)  To this end, the complaint’s allegation regarding the “2017 assessment” are 
also sufficient to demonstrate harm to the Counties’ taxing functions and correlated duties 
to ensure uniformity and equality in taxation to demonstrate justiciability and ripeness. 
(Section III, infra.) Lastly, the Counties’ claims do not rest upon solely upon tax 
assessments which may have gone unchallenged or forgone, but rather the unconstitutional 
limitation the Challenged Laws place on the Counties’ appeal to assert an appeal as to 
certain airline assessments in the first instance. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
 
To aid this Court’s understanding of the Counties’ contentions and to answer the 
Court’s additional questions, resort to the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions 
directly related to specific questions posed for appropriate context in addressing the Court’s 
questions is helpful:  
Section 2, Article XIII of the Utah Constitution provides in part:  
(1)  So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair 
market value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible property in the 
State that is not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this 
Constitution shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market 
value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
 
Utah Code Section 59-2-201(4): 
(b)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(d), the commission shall use 
an aircraft pricing guide, adjusted as provided in Subsection (4)(c), to 
determine the fair market value of aircraft assessed under this part. 
   (ii) The commission shall use the Airliner Price Guide as the aircraft 
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pricing guide, except that: 
(A) if the Airliner Price Guide is no longer published or the commission 
determines that another aircraft pricing guide more reasonably reflects 
the fair market value of aircraft, the commission, after consulting with the 
airlines operating in the state, shall select an alternative aircraft pricing 
guide; 
(B) if an aircraft is not listed in the Airliner Price Guide, the commission 
shall use the Aircraft Bluebook Price Digest as the aircraft pricing guide; 
and 
(C) if the Aircraft Bluebook Price Digest is no longer published or the 
commission determines that another aircraft pricing guide more 
reasonably reflects the fair market value of aircraft, the commission, after 
consulting with the airlines operating in the state, shall select an 
alternative aircraft pricing guide. 
(c)(i) To reflect the value of an aircraft fleet that is used as part of the 
operating property of an airline, air charter service, or air contract service, 
the fair market value of the aircraft shall include a fleet adjustment as 
provided in this Subsection (4)(c). 
   (ii) If the aircraft pricing guide provides a method for making a fleet 
adjustment, the commission shall use the method described in the aircraft 
pricing guide. 
   (iii) If the aircraft pricing guide does not provide a method for making 
a fleet adjustment, the commission shall make a fleet adjustment by 
reducing the aircraft pricing guide value of each aircraft in the fleet by 
.5% for each aircraft over three aircraft up to a maximum 20% reduction. 
(d) The commission may use an alternative method for valuing aircraft of 
an airline, air charter service, or air contract service if the commission: 
   (i) has clear and convincing evidence that the aircraft values reflected 
in the aircraft pricing guide do not reasonably reflect fair market value of 
the aircraft; and 
   (ii) cannot identify an alternative aircraft pricing guide from which the 
commission may determine aircraft value. 
 
Utah Code Section 59-2-804: 
(1) As used in this section: 
 * * *(c) “Airline revenue ton miles” means, for an airline, the total 
revenue ton miles during the calendar year that immediately precedes the 
January 1 described in Section 59-2-103. 
  * * *(g) “Mobile flight equipment allocation factor” means the sum of: 
   (i) the ground hours factor; and 
   (ii) the revenue ton miles factor. 
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(h) “Revenue ton miles” is determined in accordance with 14 C.F.R. Part 
241. 
(i) “Revenue ton miles factor” means the product of: 
(i) a fraction, the numerator of which is the Utah revenue ton miles and 
the denominator of which is the airline revenue ton miles; and 
(ii) .50. 
 * * *(k) “Utah revenue ton miles” means, for an airline, the total revenue 
ton miles within the borders of this state: 
(i) during the calendar year that immediately precedes the January 1 
described in Section 59-2-103; and 
(ii) from flight stages that originate or terminate in this state. 
(2) For purposes of the assessment of an airline's mobile flight equipment 
by the commission, a portion of the value of the airline's mobile flight 
equipment shall be allocated to the state by calculating the product of: 
(a) the total value of the mobile flight equipment; and 
(b) the mobile flight equipment allocation factor. 
 
Utah Code Section 59-2-1007(2)(b): 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a county that objects to 
the assessment of property assessed by the commission may apply to the 
commission for a hearing on the objection: 
. . . 
  (i) reasonably believes that the commission should have assessed the 
property for the current calendar year at a fair market value that is at 
least the lesser of an amount that is: 
(A) 50% greater than the value at which the commission is assessing the 
property for the current calendar year; or 
(B) 50% greater than the value at which the commission assessed the 
property for the prior calendar year . . .. 
 
II. THE COUNTIES’ CLAIMS CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
CHALLENGED LAWS MEASURED AGAINST THE CONTROLLING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
 
The Counties seek to invalidate the Challenged Laws for contravening 
constitutional mandates of uniformity and equality in taxation of property, on their face, as 
enacted by the Legislature and as applied by the Utah State Tax Commission 
6 
 
(“Commission”).  (R. 1-30.)2  In this regard, the Counties’ First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh causes of action state facial challenges to the statutes’ validity 
and contend the Challenged Laws in all or virtually all of their applications are 
constitutionally defective. Id.; Cook v. Bell, 344 P.3d 634, ¶ 29, 344 P.3d 634 (“under the 
Utah Constitution, a statute may be held unconstitutional both on its face and for any de 
facto disparate effects on similarly situated parties.”); State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 78, 
20 P.3d 342 (A facial challenge is when the statute at issue is incapable of any valid 
application).  
And while for purposes of this appeal, it is true the Counties’ claims did not first  
challenge the tax calculations from any particular tax assessment, because on their face the 
Challenged Laws violate express constitutional mandates regarding the Commission’s 
conduct of its work – i.e., irrespective of ultimate outcome, the offending statutes require 
the Tax Commission to conduct airline tax assessments from an unconstitutional starting 
point – undergoing a prior challenge would be futile and serve no point (R. 1-30). The 
Counties’ challenge lies in the Legislature’s misuse of its power through enacting statutory 
provisions that by their terms employ a structurally unconstitutional non-uniform and 
unequal compulsory system used by the Utah State Tax Commission (“Commission”) for 
airline property assessment. Id.         
                                                 
2 The parties agree the Challenged Laws are enacted and are applied by the Commission 
to the assessment of airline property. (R. 1-30 at ¶¶ 1, 14.); Defendant State of Utah’s 
Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint (R. 260-271 at ¶¶ 1, 14 (“Defendant admits that the 
Legislature enacted the Challenged Laws and that the Tax Commission applies the 
Challenged Laws.”); Answer by Intervenor Defendants Delta Airlines, Inc. and Skywest, 
Inc. (R. 610-622 at ¶¶ 1, 14, 53). 
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The Counties’ reluctant concession to a “facial” or “quasi facial” classification of 
their claims in light of their averments concerning the unconstitutional effect of the 
statutes’ application by the Commission does not have “some automatic effect” nor  
“control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge.” 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 893 (2010).3 Instead, the United 
States Supreme Court has cautioned that the distinction whether a challenge is facial or as-
applied  “goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be 
pleaded in a complaint.” Id. Thus, the fact the Counties bring facial challenges does not 
automatically compel the application of a specific test, much less the Salerno formulation 
that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.”  Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) 
(plurality opinion) (stating that “[t]o the extent we have consistently articulated a clear 
standard for facial challenges, it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the 
decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself.”); see also 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S 702, 739-40, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997) (Stevens, J. 
concurring) (criticizing the strictness of Salerno and noting the debate over the appropriate 
standard). 
                                                 
3  In Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, the Supreme Court held that that “the 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some 
automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case 
involving a constitutional challenge.” Id. 
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Because the Counties’ claims facially attack the Challenged Laws’ validity against 
controlling constitutional provisions, the Court should look to the statutes’ facial 
requirements which directly apply to the work of the Commission and not speculate about 
hypothetical cases or consider the manner in which the Commission has interpreted and 
applied the statute to any given set of facts. See e.g. Moon Lake Electric Association v. 
State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 384, 345 P.2d 612 (1959) (holding unconstitutional a 
statutory formula that on its face that capped the assessment value of a property for ad 
valorem tax purposes).  Indeed, the Counties need not disprove every possible 
hypothetical situation in which the statute might be validly applied in order to show a 
statute is constitutional from the outset. 
Following Salerno, the Supreme Court has repeatedly considered facial challenges 
simply by applying the relevant constitutional test to the challenged statute without 
attempting to conjure up whether there is a hypothetical situation in which the statute might 
be valid.  See, e.g. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011) 
(applying strict scrutiny in concluding that statute prohibiting the sale or rental of “violent 
video games” to minors violated the First Amendment); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 
898, 903-11, 913 (applying strict scrutiny in striking down, under the First Amendment 
provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) barring corporation-
funded “electioneering communications.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 
U.S. 569, 572-73, 585, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (noting that even though statute providing for NEA 
funding could be constitutionally applied in certain situations, “these permissible 
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applications would not alone be sufficient to sustain the statute against respondents’ First 
Amendment challenge”-thereby directly contradicting the “not set of circumstances” test).  
Therefore, because the Counties’ claims are not tied to a particular assessment, but 
rather the statutory provisions’ unconstitutional terms, they do not fail because a single  
assessment may (1) meet the statutory hurdle of clear and convincing threshold that allows 
the Commission to depart from the airline price guide; (2) an assessment’s valuation 
outcome may reach “fair market value,” whether even by coincidence4; or (3) a County 
may ever be able to meet the review threshold necessary to confer subject matter to the 
Commission to determine an appeal.  A law is unconstitutional in every application when 
the law itself, as opposed to some number of its applications, contains a defect that renders 
it unconstitutional under the applicable constitutional standard. Marc E. Isserles, 
Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 
Am.U.L.Rev. 359, 387 (1998) (facial challenges involve an examination of whether the 
terms of the statute itself “measured against the relevant constitutional doctrine, and 
independent of the constitutionality of particular applications, contain[ ] a constitutional 
infirmity that invalidates the statute in its entirety.”)  
                                                 
4 It should not go unnoticed by the Court that incorporating the valuation methods into 
law is unnecessary to reach fair market value. Simply, fair market value is already the 
standard under the Constitution and if any of the methods under the Challenged laws result 
in fair market value in any circumstance, the Courts and Commission are already required 
to so find. Hence, the valuation laws connected to a “clear and convincing standard” as the 
only out not to use the Valuation Laws serves no purpose but to prevent fair market value 
where the standard cannot be met, but a different value would have been otherwise reached.  
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Therefore, in context, having first challenged or been deprived of the ability to 
administratively appeal a specific 2017 assessment contributes little if anything to the 
constitutional determinations sought by the Counties. And the more clearly the issues 
raised here directly attack the validity of the statute the less need exists for the agency 
involved to shed light on them through exercise of its specialized fact-finding function or 
application of its administrative expertise to provide a “concrete set of facts.”  
III. THE COUNTIES’ HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PLED CONCRETE INJURY 
AND THE CLAIMS ARE RIPE. 
 
A declaratory judgment proceeding is available to determine the correct 
construction of a statute relating to or involving taxation where there is an actual 
controversy between the parties regarding a taxing.  Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 
P.2d 384 (Utah 1996).  An action for a declaratory judgment may be maintained, and 
declaratory relief may be awarded if the controversy which is the subject of the action is 
ripe for judicial determination. Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 597 (Utah 2003) (citing 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)).  That is, a controversy is justiciable 
such that a declaratory judgment action may be maintained, when present legal rights are 
affected, not when a controversy is merely anticipated.5   
Read in a certain light, the Supplemental Briefing Order  appears to suggest a 
brightline rule that in every case where a County challenges only the constitutionality of a 
                                                 
5 The Declaratory Judgment Act “allows for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a 
justiciable controversy.” Salt Lake Co. Comm'n v. Short 985 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1999). It 
is sufficient that the parties are adverse, the plaintiff asserts a bona fide claim, and the 
issues are ripe for adjudication. Id.  
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tax provision, that is where a County has failed to “produc[e] a specific tax assessment that 
was reduced under [the challenged provision] with a resulting loss of revenue to the 
relevant to the county” the claim cannot be ripe for adjudication because it would lack the 
necessary “concrete set of facts” against which the statute may be applied. Supplemental 
Briefing Order, June 6, 2019, pp. 1-3, citing Salt Lake City v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 
(Utah 1996).  The Court’s suggestion, if properly understood, assumes too much. 
The most obvious assumption is that administrative factual findings arising from a 
“reduced assessment” reflecting revenue loss are always material or relevant to the 
constitutional determination of a statute’s validity measured against controlling 
constitutional provisions.  They are not.  The Counties raise facial challenges to the 
statutes’ constitutionality, which when viewed in light of the compulsory nature of the 
Challenged Statutes are pure questions of law that need no express application to be 
rendered void. (R. 1-30); TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 2004 UT App 433, ¶¶ 4-5 (quoting 
Nebeker v. State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 14, 34 P.3d 180 and citing Brumley v. Tax 
Comm’n., 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993)). Rather than state a novel new interpretation 
that calls on this Court to depart from settled law, the Counties’ contention is consistent 
with precedent.  But previously and regarding other facially unconstitutional tax statutes, 
this Court accepted original jurisdiction to review the statutes’ facial conformity with the 
Utah Constitution without the production of a specific tax assessment. See e.g. Moon Lake 
Electric Association, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 345 P.2d 612 (Utah 1959) (action 
by electric and telephone industries originally brought in the district court holding two 
12 
 
property tax statute were structurally unconstitutional on their face without regard to any 
specific assessment); see also Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).   
What is more, this Court’s apparent preference for an administratively adjudicated 
assessment that evidences revenue loss assumes the Counties are always afforded an 
opportunity to challenge the reduced airline assessment in the first instance. But here, the 
challenged Threshold Law denies taxing entities - and the taxpayer’s they represent - any 
ability to appeal certain valuations that they reasonably believe fall below fair market 
value. Utah Code § 59-2-1007(2)(b). Therefore, there may not be a later time at which a 
court can effectively protect against the unequal and non-uniform taxing structure 
promulgated by the Challenged Laws provisions because that opportunity never existed.  
Moreover, equating harm to pecuniary loss assumes the Counties’ legally 
protectable interest requires some property interest. Utah law does not draw such a narrow 
definition. Rather, the Counties must demonstrate a personal interest in the court’s decision 
and that it personally suffers some actual or threatened injury as a result of the challenged 
conduct. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148-51. The Counties have done so. 
A. The Counties’ Harm Lies in the Mandatory Statutory Limitations on Airline 
Property Assessments That Prevent and Insulate From Review Accurate 
Assessment To Its Full Value. 
 
The Counties have stated a legally protectable interest in the controversy because 
the Challenged Laws directly impact the Counties’ taxing functions and correlated duties 
to ensure uniformity and equality in taxation. See Moon Lake County Bd. of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, 927 P.2d 176, 181 (citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 
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P.2d 451, 454-55 (Utah 1985) (“[C]ounties have standing to challenge determinations by 
the Tax Commission that directly affect the entities’ budgeting and taxing functions.”); 
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Com’n, 927 P.2d 176, 
177 (Utah 1976) (recognizing the right of an entity impacted by the interpretation of tax 
laws to challenge the constitutionality of those laws.)  
Here, the Counties have alleged “through their elected officials . . .  administer, 
assess, and collect property taxes[,]” including the levy and collection of “property tax on 
all Centrally Assessed property within their jurisdiction.” (R. 1-30 at ¶¶ 15, 28-33.) The 
Counties have shown they play an important role in protecting the uniformity of the ad 
valorem tax system as applied to property situated within their boundaries.  Specifically, 
“through their elected oficials,” the Counties must “ensure that all property in that county 
is assessed at fair market value, in a uniform and equal manner, so that all taxpayers share 
their proportionate tax burden” and on behalf of all locally assessed taxpayers (who have 
no right) challenge valuations of Centrally Assessed entities.  (R. 1-30 at ¶¶ 35, 77.)  
Directly impacting upon those functions, the Counties alleged that in 2017, the Utah 
State Tax Commission in complying with the Challenged Laws valued airline property “at 
an average of 39% less than” the prior year, with a “total loss in airline tax revenues of 
roughly $5 million”, thereby shifting the resulting tax burden from airlines to other 
individual or small business tax payers. (R. 1-30 at ¶ 7.) However, it is not lost revenue 
from undervalued airline assessments that serves as the basis for either past or imminent 
injury to the County.  
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 Rather, the injury or unconstitutional impact caused by the Challenged Laws is the 
fact the laws prevent the accurate fair market assessment of airline property to its full value 
in every case. Specifically, the Valuation Laws which the Commission to value only airline 
property at a number resulting from pre-determined methods and through use of 
predetermined parameters unless the Commission finds by a “clear and convincing” 
evidentiary standard the statutory method does not “arrive at fair market value.”  This 
high standard - exclusively applied to certain airline property - creates a non-uniform, 
unconstitutional barrier to a fair market value conclusion in every instance because it 
imposes a limitation on “fair market value” assessment until after the aircraft “value” has 
in fact been determined to exceed some ceiling. Such an effect, this Court has previously 
determined to be unconstitutional. Moon Lake, 927 P.2d 176.  
In Moon Lake, the offending statutes placed a cap on value. Striking the statutes, the 
Court did not need to examine whether any given assessment reached that cap. But the 
Court determined – regardless of whether the cap was ever reached, it was unconstitutional 
in every circumstance.  Similarly, the Allocation Law, unique only to airline property 
valuation, prevents accurate assessment by statutorily imposing the use of a mathematical 
formula that through its formulaic structure results in an allocation of property less than 
100%. And equally confounding, the Threshold Law has the facial potential to insulate 
affected airline valuations from review. (R. 1-30 at ¶¶ 4, 10, 77-82, 120-124.)  Summarily, 
the ad valorem tax system applied to airlines in which the Counties play an integral role in 
their respective taxing districts suffer constitutional defects and render the Counties 
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powerless to perform their constitutional duty to ensure uniform, equal, and accurate 
valuation due to the Challenged Laws unconstitutional statutory scheme until ordered 
otherwise by a court.  
B. Additional “Concrete Set of Facts” Are Not Required to Determine the 
Counties’ Claims. 
 
There is no dispute that the controversy between the parties is whether the 
Challenged Laws violate constitutional provisions that require the Legislature – and in turn 
the Tax Commission – to craft law that provide a uniform and equal rate of assessment and 
taxation on all property in the State according to its fair market value, and that all tangible 
property in the State not exempt under law shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate. A 
statute’s constitutionality is a question of law. State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 5, 428 P.3d 
1005.    
 A court cannot pass on the constitutionality of a statute unless the facts have 
matured, forming the concrete basis against which the statute may be applied. Baird v. 
State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978). The requisite showing whether “the facts have 
matured forming a concrete basis” generally requires a party “to allege sufficient facts in 
their complaint to show that the challenged statutes have been applied to them, or will soon 
be applied to them, before they have standing to bring either a facial or an as-applied 
challenge to the statute.” (Supplemental Briefing Order, at p. 3) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).  There is no dispute the Challenged Laws apply to and 
have been applied by the Commission to the assessment of airline property. (R. 130 at ¶¶ 
1, 14; R. 260-271 at ¶¶ 1, 14; R. 610-622 at ¶¶ 1, 14).  The necessary factual averments 
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supporting the Counties’ claims are set forth in their Complaint at paragraphs 4, 6, 10, 11, 
36-41, 58, 59, 74, 77-92, 94-100; 112-114, 120-122, 125. Nothing more need be alleged.  
And while the Counties recognize that the law in Utah posits that under most 
circumstances challenges to tax statutes require factual findings arising from a completed 
assessment, this is not one of those cases.  The Counties’ challenge does not arise from 
the mechanics of tax calculations arising from a tax assessment forgone or being currently 
appealed. Rather the challenge is to the misuse of legislative authority that calls on the Tax 
Commission – in every case – to ignore the constitutional mandates of uniformity and 
equality by applying structurally unconstitutional statutes that prevent legitimate estimates 
of fair market value. 
CONCLUSION 
The Counties’ factual averments to the 2017 tax assessments, among others, are 
sufficient to establish ripeness of the Challenged Laws’ invalid methodology because the 
facts necessary to adjudicate the claims (i.e. that statutes enactment) are fully developed 
and the law at issue affects the Counties in a manner that gives rise to an immediate, 
concrete dispute—the creation of an unequal and non-uniform taxing system and method. 
Administrative fact appeal proceedings are simply ill-suited for the resolution of the purely 
legal challenges presented here and would result in multiplicity or duplicative lawsuits 
where, in contrast, decision of this action would provide a tidy global resolution to the 
uncertainty of the law. Accordingly, a declaratory judgement to settle and afford relief 
concerning the uncertainty and insecurity of the constitutionally of the Challenges Laws 
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with respect to the parties’ rights, status, and other legal relations is adequate and complete.  
For these reasons, and those submitted in the Counties’ opening and reply briefs, the district 
court’s Ruling and Order dismissing the Counties’ First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh causes of action should be reversed and the matter remanded to the 
trial court for further proceedings.  
Dated this 18th day of July 2019. 
 
By:/s  Jacque M. Ramos    
Deputy District Attorney 
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